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Abstract 
 This paper utilizes opening and closing betting lines on the day of play in the 
NFL to investigate if changes in the spread are a result of uninformed bettors. I 
formulate and empirically test the changes in the spread as they relate to home field 
advantage, favorites and hot hand betting. The results show that bettors tend to 
overvalue information and as a result, the actual scores shift less dramatically than 
the spreads on the final day of betting. A profitable betting strategy can be 
implemented betting against the shift in the spread. Additionally, it is more 
profitable to bet on home underdogs than away underdogs and more profitable to 
bet on away favorites than home favorites when betting against the shift in the 
spread.  
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Introduction 
 The sports betting market has expanded exponentially over the last ten years with 
an estimated market cap of close to 1 trillion dollars (Statista.com). Sports economists 
start to pay particular attention to this market in light of its gaining popularity, especially 
over the last ten years. The NFL betting market is the largest subsection of the gambling 
market overall, so this market receives the most attention from economists with regards 
to market efficiency. Economists analyze the stock market endlessly for market 
efficiency, as the general consensus is that the stock market is efficient over an extended 
time period (McGroarty and Urquhart 2016). However, stock prices are always a 
representation of the "collective judgement" of all stock traders. The NFL betting market, 
contrarily, provides a concrete value in that there is a final score of every game that 
reflects the ability of each team on the given day. As a result, the NFL betting market is a 
much more accessible market to analyze for efficiency and given its increase in 
popularity, is a necessary topic to explore in sports economics.  
 The NFL betting market has several components. The three most popular bets are 
to bet on the money line, the spread and the over/under. The money line is a bet on a 
team to win the game and categorized by either a positive or negative number. If the 
number is positive, the team is predicted to lose, and the number represents the money 
received on a 100 dollar bet (additional to the 100 dollars placed on the bet). So, if a team 
is +100, the bettor receives 100 dollars of profit. If the money line is negative, the team is 
expected to win. Therefore, the payout will be much less on a win. If a team is -200, the 
bettor will win 50 dollars on a 100 dollar bet (oddsshark.com). The over/under line is a 
bet on whether the total score (between both teams) will be above or below the given 
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line. The payout for these bets are always one-to-one (the same as +100). The spread line 
is a predicted score difference (away-home) on the game. So if a bettor places a bet on 
the home team and the spread is -9, the home team must win by more than 9 to win the 
bet. In both over/under betting and spread betting, if the prediction is exactly the same as 
the result, there is a "push," which means that all bettors get their money back. To combat 
this result, bookmakers will often us 0.5 spread lines. Bookmakers also strategically 
make their lines to attract equal betting on each side. Bookmakers receive commission on 
each bet of about 5 percent (oddsshark.com). If the public bets heavily on one side and 
wins, the bookmaker is at risk. As a result, bookmakers are constantly changing the 
spreads in order to hedge their bets, and prevent losses.  
 The spread lines are both the most popular and most representative of the NFL 
market as a whole, which is why I choose to research this particular aspect of the NFL 
betting market in length (Ge 2018). Specifically, I analyze the changes in the spreads, by 
bookmakers, in order to hedge against possible loss. When bookmakers make their initial 
spread, the only thing that they analyze is the quality of the two teams and conditions the 
field will be played on. However, as the spread starts to change, it becomes more of a 
combination of the information about the game, and how the public view the game 
(oddsshark.com). Zuber et al (1985) serves as the baseline of the idea that the closing 
spread is the best predictor of the game outcome because information is constantly 
changing right up until game time, and earlier spreads may not incorporate these changes. 
Far fewer economists cite the bookmakers "hedging" as reason to believe that the closing 
spread is more of an indication of the public opinion, rather than quality of the teams 
(Humphreys 2011).  
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 In this paper, I build off Paul and Weinbach (2011), who find that bettors in the 
last hour are uninformed and find a profitable betting strategy betting against the majority 
of last hour bettors. I analyze the changes in the spreads in order to draw conclusions on 
the best indicators of the score, as well as look for a profitable betting strategy in this 
market. I collect data on the opening and closing money lines on the day of NFL games 
from the 2006-2014 seasons, and use an OLS third order regression model to predict the 
point spreads on each game. I also collect information regarding temperatures and 
conditions to look for profitable betting strategies in that light. I run OLS regressions of 
the actual score difference on these different variables to test for efficiency. I compare the 
results from the open and close spreads.  
 I also include variables for home and away favorites to analyze how successfully 
home favorites can cover the spread because many analysts believe in "home field 
advantage." Dare and Dennis (2011) find that home teams are often underestimated; 
however, Aadland and Wever (2012) find that all favorites (home and away) are 
overestimated. The inclusion of favorite information will help me analyze the 
discrepancies in the literature regarding home field advantage and favorites.  
 My results show that bettors tend to overvalue information, as shifts in the spread 
by one result in a less than one point shift in the actual score. My results also show that 
the opening spread lines provide a more accurate prediction of game outcomes compared 
to the closing line spreads. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
As a result, it may be profitable to bet against shifts in the spread on the final day of 
betting. Furthermore, if the spread shifts in favor of the favorite, it is more profitable to 
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bet on a home underdog than an away underdog. If the spread shifts in favor of the 
underdog, it is more profitable to bet on the away favorite than the home favorite.  
 My findings show that early bettors are more informed than the bettors that 
participate on the last day of betting. Despite a lack of information, bookmakers more 
accurately predict the game outcomes than the bettors do, even after all information is 
released leading up to game time. My model exposes inefficiencies in the NFL betting 
market, provides proof that bettors perform worse than the 50 percent that bookmakers 
aim to control, and provide a potential profitable betting strategy. My results suggest that 
in order to make this market more efficient, bookmakers must release the information 
they use to predict spreads because their predictions are better than average bettors.  
Literature Review 
Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 Fama (1970) develops an Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which states that 
all stock prices accurately and fully represent all available information to the public. The 
EMH often references the random walk of prices, which results in individual investors 
not able to “beat the market” because no investor has access to information not available 
to everyone. Fama (1970) assumes that current prices are only impacted by current 
information, and not impacted by historical prices. Fama (1970) also assumes that all 
information is available for free. Fama (1970) considers three diverse types of efficiency: 
weak form, semi strong form, and strong form. Weak form refers to using historical 
prices or return sequences, semi strong form refers to newly released information 
(earnings, news reports, etc.), and strong form refers to “monopolistic information” 
(insider information not available to everyone). Fama (1970) note that though there is a 
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severe lack of information regarding insider information (and rules to regulate that kind 
of trading), the first two forms give us strong insights to test the efficiency of a market. 
Fama (1970) concludes, as stated earlier, that stock price history and previous return 
sequences do not have any impact on the performance of the stock in the future. Fama 
(1970) also finds that stock prices only reflect semi-strong form, and therefore reflect the 
information currently released regarding the performance of the business.  
 There are several drawbacks to the EMH, though this literature should serve as 
the basis for any efficient market analysis. Howden (2009) critiques the EMH on a few 
accounts. Firstly, the literature assumes that all market information is interpreted in the 
same way; in reality, there have been several investors to beat the market, and people 
value different stocks in different ways. Secondly, he cites the transactions costs 
associated with trading to take away from market efficiency. As a result, a profitable 
investment strategy that "beats the market" must account for the commission costs 
investors' pay. Thirdly, the time it takes to process a transaction often times results in a 
discrepancy between the bid price and buy prices. The conclusion is that the EMH is too 
unrealistic to apply to the financial markets. Despite these limitations, the EMH can still 
serve as a basis for analyzing markets.   
Unprofitable Betting Strategies 
 Applying the EMH to the NFL betting market, if the NFL betting market was 
efficient, then there would be no profitable gambling strategies. Furthermore, since 
gambling commission is around 5 percent, all betting strategies, in the long run, should 
result in a net loss of about 5 percent. This is different from the short run, where 
profitable betting strategies may appear successful. Zuber et al. (1985) analyze the 
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efficiency of the NFL betting market in two ways. First, using traditional finance 
literature, they use an equation that relates the actual point spread of the NFL game to the 
Las Vegas Odds for the spread of the game. It is important to note that the Las Vegas 
Odds do not reflect the bookkeeper’s initial prediction of the game’s outcome, but rather 
uses all of the bets placed to reflect the optimal spread on the game. Just as stock prices 
reflect the continuous trading by investors and the prices they are willing to pay, the Las 
Vegas point spread represents the “collective judgement” of all bettors involved. 
Therefore, the Las Vegas odds for the spread are closing spreads (the spread when betting 
closes for a given game). If the market is efficient from the EMH, the coefficient under 
OLS regressions should be 1; in other words, the relation between the Vegas odds and the 
actual point spread should be a one to one ratio. Though Zuber et al. (1985) find a strong 
correlation, the study must also test to see if the Las Vegas odds have no impact on the 
actual results of the game (which intuitively makes sense). There is a stronger correlation 
of the latter, implying that additional tests of efficiency must be conducted.  
 Zuber et al. (1985) perform a second test that aims to find a profitable betting 
strategy, which if found, would mean there are some inefficiencies in the market. The 
model is an OLS regression of the realized point difference of a certain game on a vector 
of variables that includes yards rushing, yards passing, number of wins prior to the game, 
fumbles, interceptions, number of penalties, proportion of passing places to total plays 
and number of rookie players. The vector, similar to the realized point difference, is a 
difference of the two team's statistics. The results show less than a five percent loss, 
which shows inefficiencies in the market as stated above. The data analyzed is only over 
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one season, so there are definitely significant restrictions on the results, but the model 
serves as the basis to test NFL betting market efficiency.  
 Amundson et al. (2006) uses the same ideas as the literature before; however, the 
variable of interest is the surface of the field the game is played on. The OLS regression 
is of the realized point difference on the predicted point spread, using a dummy variable 
to analyze if the field is grass or not. The other main variables are the overall record and 
overall point spread for the season. The overall record and overall point spread play a 
major role in the Las Vegas Odds spread decision, so the model can effectively analyze 
whether the field effects the teams playing. Teams that are used to turf may have trouble 
performing on grass. However, the results did not find a favorable betting strategy, which 
means that NFL players do not have trouble making a transition to the different types of 
fields. Amundson et al. (2006) considers a variety of different stadium characteristics, 
including the size of the stadium, but none of these result in a profitable betting strategy. 
As a result, it may help in a different context, but is not as relevant to my study.   
 Borghesi (2007) considers field conditions as well, as the study analyzes if teams 
can’t perform in colder conditions than they are used to. The model uses the same 
regression model as Amundson et al. (2006), but implements an additional variable that 
analyzes the difference between the average temperatures in the team’s hometown verse 
the average temperatures where the game is played. This is a very impactful study 
because many bettors believe that teams from the south will struggle in the north. The 
case is less believed when cold weather teams travel down south. The results show that 
historically teams from warm weather areas struggle in cold temperatures, as there seems 
to be a profitable betting strategy betting on teams from colder weather to do better. This 
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is another variable that I am very interested in, and given the results, should include in 
my analysis, as cold weather is both something that affects players and gamblers.   
 The literature that does not find profitable betting strategies use variables that 
have already been included in the point spread set by Las Vegas, as offensive and 
defensive statistics are considered before setting point spreads. However, this literature 
does serve as the basis for all point spread analysis. Using my dataset, I will first run a 
regression of realized point difference on point spread to test for market efficiency (a 
coefficient of 1 indicates a perfectly efficient market).  Then, I can include other 
variables, such as type of field and temperature, to test for inefficiencies.  
Favorites and Home Field Advantage 
 The previous section discusses variables that should already be factored in to the 
point spreads, which is why the betting strategies prove not to be profitable. In this 
section, I will look at variables that are popular amongst bettors, but may not be as much 
of a part of the point spread, in order to find profitable betting strategies against the rest 
of the market. The two most common variables that bettors tend to over-consider are 
home field advantage (teams play better than their statistics may show at home) and 
favorites (the better team has a much larger spread to cover).  
 A common betting strategy, especially present in the NFL, relates to the home-
underdog bias. The home-underdog bias is based on the idea that road favorites have 
trouble covering the spread. Bettors tend to overvalue the success of the road favorites. 
Dare and Dennis (2011) analyze this idea to see if there is a profitable betting strategy in 
betting for home underdogs. To analyze this phenomena, the study looks at the NFL 
seasons from 2005-2011. Dare and Dennis (2011) look at a mean forecast error. In other 
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words, the study looks at the difference between the spread and the final result. Once the 
forecasting error is determined, the study runs a simple t test against 0, to see where the 
biases lie with respect to favorites and home teams. Their results find that bettors 
underestimate the scoring potential of home teams, both favorites and underdogs, and the 
results are statistically significant. As a result, there could be a profitable betting strategy 
from betting on home teams, as the spreads are generally lower than the results indicate.  
 Aadland and Wever (2012) look at a different betting strategy, which is the idea 
that favorites have trouble covering large spreads. As a result, Aadland and Wever (2012) 
use a probit model to analyze how the favorites do at covering the spread. The model 
regresses whether the home team wins the bet on home favorites, home underdogs and 
creates an interaction variable between the two variables and the closing line. To analyze 
the results, Aadland and Wever (2012) use the coefficients to predict the closing line that 
will have a winning probability of 53 percent (which accounts for the implied 
commission). The model predicts that underdogs are significantly underpriced, which 
means that the spread on a game involving a significant underdog is usually higher than it 
should be. Specifically, if the home team is the underdog, and the spread is above 6.5, a 
profitable betting strategy can be implemented betting on the underdog. If the visiting 
team is the underdog and the spread is above 10.5, there can be a profitable betting 
strategy betting on the underdog. Bettors tend to bet on favorites, and as a result, the 
spreads are a little higher than they should be. These conclusions prove that there may be 
inefficiencies in the market because bettors tend to both favor the home team and bet on 
the underdog. These two variables seem important to gamblers, and therefore should 
definitely be considered when I do my analysis. 
13 
 
 Humphreys et al. (2013) critique the previous literature by using data from more 
seasons. First, the study replicates the model from before in order to see how their 
hypothesis holds up under a longer time interval. The results are similar to Dare and 
Dennis (2011); however, Humphreys et al. (2013) find an interesting difference. 
Humphreys et al. (2013) could reject the null hypothesis that the mean forecast error was 
zero for away favorites, but could not reject the null hypothesis for home underdogs. The 
study infers that the home-underdog favorite is only a small part of a much bigger story. 
Similar to Aadland and Wever (2012), Humphreys et al. (2013) believe that bettors just 
tend to favor teams that have been successful and therefor the favorite teams to cover the 
spreads. Paul and Weinbach (2002) find that, in general, due to psychological reasons, 
bettors tend to bet on the better teams. Using this theory, Humphreys et al. (2013) 
propose a different model to analyze if this hypothesis was true. Using data from 
sportsnights.com, they first look at betting percentages on favorites over the years in 
question to see if their hypothesis is true. As expected, the percentages prove that bettors 
tend to bet on favorites to cover the spread. It is important to note that these percentages 
look at total bets places and are not effected by total money placed on bets (Las Vegas 
sets their odds based on total money on each side of the bet, as mentioned before in order 
to hedge their losses). However, Humphreys et al. (2013) claim the high percentages are 
enough to hypothesize that there could be a bias. Instead of analyzing the mean forecast 
error, the study looks at determining a profitable betting strategy by looking at the 
percentage of bets that would win. Using the same data as Dare and Dennis (2011), 
Humphreys et al. (2013) find no profitable betting strategy in betting against favorites 
with this new approach. In conclusion, although bettors definitely prefer betting on 
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favorites, the betting market correctly anticipates this outcome, and no profitable betting 
strategies can be found through this type of strategy.  
 Clearly, bettors over-bet the favorites in the NFL. Davis et al. (2013) looks at 
betting against the favorites in a different light. During week one of the NFL betting 
season, most of the information regarding the spreads rely on the prior season. As a 
result, the study looks at how teams fare during week one of the season that make the 
playoffs the season before. Specifically, the study looks at teams that made the playoffs 
competing against teams that did not make the playoffs to see if there is a bias towards 
these teams. In the simulation, which looks at season 2004-2012, teams cover the spread 
only 35.7 percent of the time. In other words, playoff teams do not cover the week one 
spread against non-playoff teams. Though this paper makes interesting points, the EMH 
is a long run theory, so looking at only one week of the season does not point out 
inefficiencies in the market.  
 The majority of the literature shows that bettors prefer to bet on favorites and that 
there could be a profitable betting strategy betting against the favorites. Specifically, the 
literature shows that away teams have trouble covering and/or beating the spread. As a 
result, I will include a dummy variable for the home team, favorite and home favorite and 
create interaction variables to see if I can find statistically significant differences. With 
this separation, I can analyze the "home underdog bias" and draw conclusions about how 
successfully home and away favorites cover the spread.  
Hot Hand  
 The "hot hand" belief refers to the idea that teams that have recent successes will 
continue to succeed. The two competing theories are that bettors tend to overvalue recent 
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successes and teams on winning streaks are more likely to succeed. The theory is first 
associated with the NBA because many believe that shooters go on streaks. Camerer 
(1989) and Brown and Sauer (1993) develop this model, claiming that bettors will bet 
heavily for teams on winning streaks and against teams on losing streaks. As a result, 
both studies find a profitable betting strategy, finding that the "mythical hot hand" skews 
the point spreads for teams on streaks. Paul and Weinbach (2005) further this research by 
finding a profitable betting strategy betting against teams on winning streaks.  
 The "hot hand" ideology can also be applied to the NFL betting market, as 
spreads could be skewed towards teams on winning streaks and against teams on winning 
streaks.  Woodland and Woodland (2000) analyze this idea looking for the same 
profitable betting strategy found in the NBA. In their study, there are no profitable betting 
strategies betting against the streaks. The study concludes that there are no inefficiencies 
due to hot hand bettors. However, this idea assumes that bookkeepers change the spreads 
in order to attract equal bets on either side, and as a result the spreads on teams on 
winning streaks are falsely high. Humphreys (2011) shatters that idea with a study that 
proves bookkeepers actually take a stance on the games in order to exploit misinformed 
bettors and produce higher returns. He did this by comparing the initial and final spreads 
of games to the actual scores, and analyzed the returns the bookkeepers received. If 
bookkeepers did keep "balanced books," then in the long run their returns should be 
solely their commission. However, this study shows that bookkeepers in the NFL could 
calculate spreads independent of bettors. If the initial spread results in the public betting 
heavily on one side, then bookmakers miscalculate the initial spread, and must adjust the 
spread to fit public opinion. Hence, bookmakers must use public opinion to calculate 
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spreads (Bookmakers use the spread to even the betting field). In the same light, 
bookmakers make excess profits from their initial line being misinterpreted by the public, 
rather than the way they adjust the spreads.  
 Paul et al (2014) take this idea a step further by critiquing the previous literature. 
Though there may not be a profitable betting strategy betting against teams on streaks, 
there still could be evidence of bettors betting on streaks. Instead of looking at data on the 
spreads, this study looks at betting percentages, so that even if the spread does not 
account for hot hand betting, evidence can be shown that it exists. The study defines 
winning streaks by how many wins consecutively against the spread a team has, leading 
up to the game. Losing streaks, similarly, are defined by consecutive losses against the 
spread leading up to the game. Using data from the 2005-2006 season and 2008-2009 
season, the study finds that teams on winning streaks against the spread attract more bets 
than other teams. The same was concluded for losing streaks. Therefore, initial spreads 
often move in favor of "hot" teams and away from "cold" teams. The literature 
aforementioned consistently refer to winning streaks against the spread; however, the 
average bettor may only consider winning streaks outright when making their decisions. 
As a result, analysis should be conducted in order to determine if traditional winning 
streaks can either lead to a profitable betting strategy or expose "imbalanced books."   
 Though it seems there can be no profitable betting strategy betting against the hot 
hand principle, there is evidence that bettors over bet teams with recent success. 
Applying the ideas of the hot hand coupled with the "imbalanced bookkeepers" could 
bring to light meaningful conclusions about the discrepancies between the "collective 
judgment" mentioned earlier and the actual spread of these games.  
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Last Hour of Betting 
 The last hour of betting is a relatively new and under-researched topic in betting. 
The idea was first analyzed by Ottaviani and Sorenson (2008) in the horse betting market. 
The idea was simple: the most informed bettors place their bets in the last hour of betting 
because they wanted access to all available information before making their decision (as 
shown the EMH). Through their simple analysis, bets placed within the last hour of 
betting did exceptionally well supporting their hypothesis. The horse betting market 
differs significantly from the NFL betting market because the odds on horses are not 
released until after all bets are placed, so all bettors receive the same odds. In the NFL, all 
bettors may have a slightly different spread because the spreads are updated 
continuously. As a result, it makes sense that horse bettors wait until as close to post time 
as possible because the odds at that time will be most predictable of the odds they will 
receive. Despite this difference, NFL betting markets generally receive between 20 and 
25 percent of their bets within the last hour of betting.  
 Miller and Rapach (2013) analyze the changes in the spread over the course of the 
week in the 1972 season because of their theory that the spread becomes more accurate as 
the week progresses. They separate their spreads into three categories; beginning of the 
week, Tuesday's opening line and closing line. Miller and Rapach use OLS regression 
analysis to compare the differences between the spreads and conclude that closing 
spreads are the best indicator of outcome, Tuesday spreads are the second best, and 
opening is the worst. Later, they use betting percentages and lag variables to put together 
a more in depth analysis, but my data limits me from performing such analysis. This data 
is also from only one season, and a season 45 years ago, so there are significant 
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limitations to this study, but the simpler models comparing the different lines are relevant 
and necessary for my analysis.  
 With such a high percentage of bets occurring in the last hour, Paul and Weinback 
(2011) wanted to analyze whether bettors in the last hour were also more informed and 
therefore could produce higher returns than the other bettors. After conducting an 
analysis of the last hour of betting, looking for trends in the data, the study found that 
bettors tend to prefer the same betting strategies found in most of the literature (betting 
on favorites, home teams, etc.), which does mimic the betting of the general public. In 
other words, not only does the last hour of betting not show evidence of informed trading, 
but additionally the last hour of betting could be uninformed. As a result, the study looks 
for a profitable betting strategy by betting against the bettors in the last hour. To do this, 
the study looks at how the spread changes over the last hour of betting and sets up betting 
simulations against the move in the spread. For example, if the spread increases over the 
last hour, bettors in the last hour bet on the favorite, and therefore their simulation would 
bet on the underdog. Through these simulations, the study did find a profitable betting 
strategy, as 60 percent of the time, these bets are successful. The study has two notable 
conclusions relevant to my study. Firstly, in an efficient market, the time the bet is placed 
should have no impact on betting strategies because the spreads should accurately depict 
all available information on the game, and therefore still should show no profitable 
betting strategy. Secondly, if the bettors in the last hour are similar to the overall betting 
market, there may be a profitable betting strategy simply betting against the public, which 
would further back Humphreys (2011) claim that bookkeepers take a stance on games to 
strengthen their earnings potential.   
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 Comparing the last hour of betting to the opening spreads could provide 
information regarding two things. First, there could be a profitable betting strategy simply 
betting against the public, which has been the common theme in every section. But 
secondly, I can analyze the changes in the spread to determine if there exists "imbalanced 
bookkeeping." Since the literature on last hour of betting is minimal, my paper hopes to 
reexamine the variables mentioned before in this new light.  
 My paper will extend traditional literature of field conditions and temperature as 
they relate to the spread by analyzing opening and closing spreads, and look for 
discrepancies, as well as determine which line more accurately represent the game 
outcome. After this, I will create additional variables for both home team and favorite in 
order to further analyze the relationships between the spread and the realized point score. 
Finally, I will analyze how changes in the spread effect the home team's chances of 
covering the spread. Much of the previous literature analyzes these variables with respect 
to closing spreads only, so I will be able to extend the analysis in to comparing opening 
and closing spreads, and hope to find a profitable betting strategy using public opinion.   
 
Data 
 In order to analyze the efficiency of the NFL Betting market, I will look at games 
from the 2006-2014 NFL seasons and look for inefficiencies with respect to the type of 
field, as well as the temperature. My data is divided up by season. My first data set comes 
from armchairanalys.com. This data set includes dummy variables for grass fields, as 
well as dome fields. The data set also includes the temperature at the start of every game. 
The final scores for each game result are included as well (away-home). To distinguish 
20 
 
my paper from previous literature, I compile an additional data set from 
Pinnaclesports.com. This data set includes both opening and closing money lines on the 
day of the game.  In order to combine the data sets, I match up the games by season, 
away team and home team. As a result, I omit all observations that do not include 
opening money line, closing money line or the result of the game. I also omit all 
preseason games because teams play preseason games differently than regular season 
games to avoid injury. Since I have different sources of data, I omit all duplicate games, 
and only use the first entry for each game used. There are a total of 9,142 observations 
omitted. Despite the missing data points, I have 1,641 observations. My data is a time 
series, as the total aggregate games are separated by season. I will analyze the differences 
between opening and closing lines and spot any differences. Finally, I will look at the 
popular vote to see if how the spread changes can provide a profitable betting strategy. 
All of these models hope to spot inefficiencies in the market.  
 Zuber et al (1985) serve as the basis for NFL betting analysis, and much of the 
literature to follow agree that the closing lines are the most accurate representation of the 
game result. This can be attributed to last minute injuries and other information that may 
not become available until minutes before kickoff. Miller and Rabach (2013) perform an 
analysis of the 1972 NFL season that proves that as more information is analyzed and 
more bettors participate in the market, the line shifts toward a better representation of the 
game outcomes. However, Paul and Weinbach (2011) develop a new idea that as more 
and more bettors place their bets, the line becomes a less accurate representation of the 
game. Bookmakers study the NFL with much more scrutiny than the majority of bettors, 
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so Paul and Weinback (2011) conclude that bettors actually disrupt the betting market. As 
a result, I hope to analyze the conflicting theories using opening and closing line data.  
 Ge (2018), Cortis (2015), and Card and Dahl (2011) prove in their literature the 
importance of the spread in the NFL, as a better indicator of the betting market than the 
money line. Cortis (2015) explains that the spread attracts equal bets on either side, while 
the money line does not. The spread is both easier to interpret, and more relevant for my 
research. As a result, I must convert my money line data to spread data.  Ge (2018) 
outlines a model to convert money line data to the probability that the home team wins by 
using a model from Cortis (2015). The model is relatively simple, but does provide an 
easy way to determine the probability. Equation (1) shows the model below.  
(1)    𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 =
{
 
 +100 (
1 − 𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑖
) , 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 0.5
−100 (
𝑝𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑖
) , 𝑝𝑖 > 0.5}
 
 
 
 Using this equation, I convert all of my money lines to a probability that the home 
team will win. The next step, similar to Card and Dahl (2011) is to create a relationship 
between the realized score difference in the game (away team points minus home team 
points) and the probability that the home team will win. Since the relationship between 
the point spread and the realized score difference is one-to-one for most data sets of high 
volume, I will use the same relationship as point spread to probability in order to predict 
the pregame point spreads. Card and Dahl (2011) claim that there is a third order 
polynomial relation between the two variables; when the spread is within three points, a 
change in the spread will have a linear relationship to probability. As the spread climbs 
up above 10 points, changes in the point spread will have a smaller impact on the 
probability of the game because on team is already so heavily favored. As a result, I come 
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up with a simple third order regression model that relates realized score difference with 
probability that the home team will win, as listed below in equation (2). 
(2)  𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖
3 + 𝐸𝑖 
  
 After running this regression, I predict the spreads at the beginning of the day and 
at the close of betting for each game in my dataset. I have now calculated a predicted 
point spread that I will use for the remainder of my methodology and results. Using the 
predicted opening and closing spreads, I also create a dummy variable to describe if the 
spread moves in favor of the home team, as well as a variable that measures the 
difference between the opening and closing spread, which will be helpful in my analysis.  
Table 1 
Variable Observation Mean St Deviation Mine Max 
Opening Spread 1,641 -1.981718 5.83235 -17.48295 11.10715 
Closing Spread 1,641 -1.981718 5.928049 -17.76627 12.2923 
Difference 1,641 -1.984775 15.31817 -59 45 
Temperature 1,641 49.39038 26.79876 0 99 
      
      
 
 Table 1 shows some summary statistics of my data. The mean opening and 
closing spread is -1.981718, which means that the home teams are favored more often 
than the away teams. The values are also the same, which shows that there may not be a 
large deviation between the opening and closing spreads. Additionally, the actual 
difference in scores is -1.984775, which is slightly different, but the close relation shows 
that the spread is a good indicator of the final score. Furthermore, the standard deviation 
is much higher for the actual score than the spreads because bookmakers try not to favor 
one teams heavily. A high standard deviation can also be an indicator of inefficiency; 
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however, further regression analysis needs to be done in order to draw more meaningful 
conclusions. The average temperature is 49.39038.  
 My data also includes information regarding the home team and favorites in the 
game, as much of the literature consider these variables. As seen in Figure 1 below, the 
betting market heavily favors the home team, as both bettors and bookmaker's alike value 
the home field advantage. Furthermore, when the home team is favored initially, the 
spread tends to increase in magnitude much more frequently than for the away favorites. 
As a result, it is necessary to consider the differences between home and away favorites. 
After taking a closer look at the data, I can get in to the methodology. 
 
 
Figure 1 
  
  
 Lastly, my data includes hot hand information on both teams of each game in the 
dataset. In other words, each team (away and home) of each game has a number for the 
consecutive wins and losses over the last three games. I will use this data to analyze the 
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effects of streaks on the outcomes of the game. Streaks do not go over multiple seasons, 
so during week one, none of the teams are on streaks.   
Methodology  
 I choose not to use a probit model, similar to Aadland and Wever (2012). Though 
many bettors only care whether their bet wins or loses, the exact differences between the 
spread and the realized point difference are important for large datasets. My methodology 
comes from both Amundson et al. (2006) and Bhorghesi (2007), who take the simple 
OLS regression model of realized score difference on point spread and add a dummy 
variable for field condition, as well as a variable for temperature. The dummy variable 
will be whether the stadium is a dome or not. I hypothesize that home teams will have an 
advantage under dome conditions because they are used to it. Considering the difficulty 
that comes with playing in cold weather, I hypothesize that road teams will struggle in 
colder conditions. I will conduct the analysis on both initial lines and closing lines, as 
well. Sudden changes in the temperature may result in bettors making bets against the 
favorite to cover the spread. I also include a variable for fixed effects by season in my 
regression, so that the data is analyzed on a per season basis. Since there may be home 
team fixed effects as well, I will also include a variable for home team fixed effects. I 
have included the two new models below. 
(3)    𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + τ𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
  
(4)   𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
 
 For each game 𝑖 in season 𝑡, if 𝛽1 is greater than 1, the favorites tend to cover the 
spread, as a one point increase/decrease in the spread results in more than a one point 
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increase/decrease in the realized score difference. If 𝛽1 is less than one, the favorites tend 
to not cover the spread as a one point increase/decrease in the spread result in a less than 
one point increase/decrease in the realized score difference. Additionally, I will run two 
more regressions including a variable for temperature squared, as Borghesi (2007) 
outlines is an additional test for how temperature effects the score. The two models are 
listed below.  
(5)    𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + τ𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
  
(6)    𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + τ𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
 
 
 Next, I will conduct my analysis on the "home field advantage," as many bettors 
and bookmaker's alike feel that teams play better at home. I have a dummy variable for 
when the home team is the favorite. I will include this new variable, and then create 
interaction variables between the home favorite variable and the variable of interest 
(spread). In this case, I am adding two variables to equations (3) and (4). Before running 
this regression, I must test for collinearity, as there is a high chance that there could be 
collinearity between the spread variable and the two new variables. In the case of the 
home favorite model, there does exist collinearity, so I drop the interaction variable. My 
new model regresses the realized point difference on temperature, dome nand the dummy 
variable for home favorite.  
(7)    𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
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(8)    𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
 I hypothesize, similar to Dare and Dennis (2011) and Aadland and Wever (2012), 
bettors tend to underestimate the ability of the home team to score. Therefore, I expect 
the coefficient 𝑏1 in both equation (5) and (6) to be greater than 1, indicating that the 
home favorites tend to cover the spread more often than otherwise. I also expect the 
coefficient to be greater than 𝑏1 from equations (3) and (4), indicating that home favorites 
cover the spread more often than overall favorites do.  
 Next, I will explore models that incorporate a dummy variable for when the home 
team is an underdog and use a similar model to before. With this dummy variable and 
interaction variable addition, there is no collinearity between the additional variables and 
spread, so I can create these models as shown below.  
 
(9)    𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
(10)    𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + τt + 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
 
  For equations (7) and (8), staying in line with the "home underdog bias," I 
hypothesize away favorites teams to have trouble covering the spread, so 𝑏1 should be 
less than 1. I also expect 𝑏1 to be lower than 𝑏1 from equations (3) and (4).  
 I will also analyze the effects of recent success on the scores of the games by 
including a variable for streak. In order to do so, I will include a fixed effects variable for 
the streak. The streak variable will be 0 if the team is not on a winning streak, 1 if the 
team is on a one game winning streak, 2 if the team is on a two game winning streak, and 
3 if the team is on a three game winning streak. I will then do the same for both the home 
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and away team, for winning and losing streaks, and for opening and closing spread. The 
models will be the same as equations (3) and (4); however, there will be hot hand fixed 
effects. I hypothesize that bettors will overvalue teams on winning streaks and 
undervalue teams on losing streaks. As a result, I predict a profitable betting strategy 
betting against the "hot hand" and with the "cold hand." 
 Finally, I will analyze how the change in the point spread (from open to close) 
effects the realized point difference. In order to do this, I will run a standard two tail t test 
between the open and closed coefficients in each of the six equations to see if their 
difference is significant. The equations for the t statistic is listed below. The number of 
observations is the same for open and close, so 𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = 𝑛𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 = 𝑛 
Null Hypothesis: 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 = 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 
Alternative Hypothesis: 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 ≠ 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 
(11)      𝑡 =
𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 − 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁
√(𝑆𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸
2 + 𝑆𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁
2 )
𝑛
 
Results 
Table 2 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Difference Difference 
   
OpenSpread 
(𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) 
0.881***  
 (0.0647)  
ClosingSpread 
(𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸) 
 0.886*** 
  (0.0631) 
Dome -1.576 -1.796 
 (2.612) (2.605) 
Temperature -0.00431 -0.00624 
 (0.0202) (0.0200) 
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Constant 0.00493 0.353 
 (2.949) (2.946) 
   
Season FE Yes Yes 
Team FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,641 1,641 
R-squared 0.174 0.178 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Table 2 shows the results from equation (3) and (4). The opening and closing 
spread coefficients are significant at the 1% level. A change in the opening spread by one 
point results in a 0.881 change in the actual score and a change in the closing spread by 
one point results in a 0.886 difference in the actual score. The closing spread is a slightly 
better indicator of actual score. The coefficients of the dome and temperature variables 
are both positive, but insignificant. The t statistic for the difference in opening and 
closing spread is approximately 0.056, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 
from equation (3) equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 from equation (4) at the 5% level. 
Table 3 
 (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Difference Difference 
   
OpenSpread 
(𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) 
0.880***  
 (0.0647)  
ClosingSpread 
(𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸) 
 0.885*** 
  (0.0631) 
   
Dome -0.941 -1.341 
 (2.690) (2.674) 
Temperature 0.0376 0.0237 
 (0.0708) (0.0700) 
tempsq -0.000455 -0.000325 
 (0.000756) (0.000749) 
Constant -0.678 -0.136 
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 (3.066) (3.052) 
   
Season FE Yes Yes 
Team FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,641 1,641 
R-squared 0.174 0.178 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 3 shows the results from equations (5) and (6), which includes a 
temperature squared term. Once again, the coefficients of opening and closing spreads are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, while the dome and temperature coefficients are 
not statistically significant. A change in the opening spread by one point results in a 
change in the actual score of 0.88 and the change in the closing spread by one point 
results in a 0.885 change in the actual score. The t statistic for the difference between 
opening and closing spread is still 0.056, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 from equation (3) equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 from equation (4). 
 
Table 4 
 (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Difference Difference 
   
OpenSpread (𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) 0.788***  
 (0.104)  
HomeFavoritesOpen -1.417  
 (1.236)  
ClosingSpread (𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸)  0.731*** 
  (0.101) 
HomeFavoritesClose  -2.436* 
  (1.246) 
Dome -1.403 -1.674 
 (2.607) (2.600) 
Temperature -0.00377 -0.00600 
 (0.0201) (0.0199) 
Constant 0.608 1.535 
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 (3.023) (3.052) 
Season FE Yes Yes 
Team FE Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1,641 1,641 
R-squared 0.174 0.180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 4 shows the results from equations (7) and (8). As with the previous 
models, the spread coefficients are statistically significant and the dome and temperature 
coefficients are not. In equation (7), the coefficient for the dummy variable is 
insignificant and negative in magnitude and in equation (8), the coefficient is significant 
at the 10% level and negative as well. When the home team is the favorite at the start of 
game day, the actual score difference is 1.5 less than otherwise and 2.43 less when the 
home team is the favorite when betting closes. The t statistic for the difference in opening 
and closing spread lines is well above 3.2, so we can reject the null hypothesis that 
𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 from equations (7) and (8) at the 1% level.   
 
Table 5 
 (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Difference Difference 
   
OpenSpread (𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) 0.811***  
 (0.114)  
AwayFavoritesOpen 1.758  
 (1.432)  
AFOpenSpread -0.125  
 (0.264)  
ClosingSpread (𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸)  0.770*** 
  (0.110) 
AwayfavoritesClose  3.032** 
  (1.485) 
AFCloseSpread  -0.210 
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  (0.264) 
Dome -1.440 -1.784 
 (2.610) (2.609) 
Temperature -0.00371 -0.00626 
 (0.0201) (0.0200) 
Constant -0.668 -0.621 
 (2.989) (2.966) 
Season FE Yes Yes 
Team FE Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1,641 1,641 
R-squared 0.174 0.180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 5 shows the results from equations (9) and (10). The coefficients of the 
spreads are statistically significant at the 1% level. The dome, temperature, and the 
interaction variables are not significant. The away favorite dummy variable is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the closing spread model, but insignificant in the opening 
spread model. When the away team is the favorite at the start of game day, the spread is 
1.758 higher than otherwise and when the away team is the favorite at the end of betting, 
the spread is 3.032 higher than otherwise. The t statistic for the difference in opening and 
closing spread lines is well above 3.2, so we can reject the null hypothesis that 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 
equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 from equations (7) and (8) at the 1% level.   
Table 6 
 (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES Difference Difference Difference Difference 
     
OpenSpread 0.882*** 0.880*** 0.875*** 0.888*** 
 (0.0670) (0.0669) (0.0676) (0.0672) 
Dome 0.212 0.210 0.261 0.252 
 (1.118) (1.114) (1.117) (1.117) 
Temperature 0.0193 0.0190 0.0195 0.0195 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
1.HomeLoseStreak 0.0226    
32 
 
 (0.860)    
2.HomeLoseStreak -0.737    
 (1.132)    
3.HomeLoseStreak 0.638    
 (1.095)    
1.HomeWinStreak  -0.102   
  (0.858)   
2.HomeWinStreak  0.591   
  (1.153)   
3.HomeWinStreak  0.394   
  (1.154)   
1.AwayLoseStreak   0.872  
   (0.822)  
2.AwayLoseStreak   -0.0506  
   (1.148)  
3.AwayLoseStreak   0.727  
   (1.255)  
1.AwayWinStreak    -0.696 
    (0.883) 
2.AwayWinStreak    -0.537 
    (1.118) 
3.AwayWinStreak    0.169 
    (1.120) 
Constant 0.227 0.198 -0.0206 0.394 
 (1.493) (1.483) (1.484) (1.487) 
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 
R-squared 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 Table 6 shows the results from the hot hand model for the opening spread. In this 
model, the coefficient is much closer to 1 than the previous models, but the streak data 
does not provide any statistically significant coefficients. I expect teams on winning 
streaks to do better and teams on losing streaks to do worse, so the signs for home 
winning streak and away losing streak to be negative, and the signs for away winning 
streak and home losing streak to be positive. However, the results show home teams on 
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two or three game winning streaks to favor the away team and away teams on one or 
three game winning streaks to favor the away team as well. When the home team is on a 
two game losing streak or the away team is on a one or two game winning streak, the 
results show the home team to have an advantage. Given the insignificance of the results 
coupled with the randomness of the signs of the coefficients, I conclude that the hot hand 
does not provide an opportunity for a profitable betting strategy.   
 
Table 7 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) 
VARIABLES Difference Difference Difference Difference 
     
ClosingSpread 0.888*** 0.886*** 0.880*** 0.892*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0657) (0.0663) (0.0659) 
Dome 0.139 0.140 0.196 0.187 
 (1.119) (1.116) (1.119) (1.118) 
Temperature 0.0165 0.0161 0.0168 0.0168 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
1.HomeLoseStreak 0.0368    
 (0.862)    
2.HomeLoseStreak -0.740    
 (1.125)    
3.HomeLoseStreak 0.603    
 (1.092)    
1.HomeWinStreak  -0.126   
  (0.855)   
2.HomeWinStreak  0.634   
  (1.150)   
3.HomeWinStreak  0.505   
  (1.148)   
1.AwayLoseStreak   0.957  
   (0.817)  
2.AwayLoseStreak   -0.0240  
   (1.142)  
3.AwayLoseStreak   0.722  
   (1.250)  
1.AwayWinStreak    -0.795 
    (0.878) 
2.AwayWinStreak    -0.436 
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    (1.120) 
3.AwayWinStreak    0.174 
    (1.123) 
Constant 0.408 0.368 0.132 0.571 
 (1.498) (1.485) (1.488) (1.489) 
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 
R-squared 0.154 0.153 0.154 0.154 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 7 shows the results from the hot hand closing spreads model. The results 
are very similar to the opening spread model, so I draw the same conclusion that the "hot 
hand" does not provide opportunity for profitable betting strategy. The t statistic between 
the opening and closing spreads is less than 1, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 equals 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸. 
Discussion 
 Equations (3) and (4) are standard regressions looking at the relationship between 
the actual score difference on open spread/close spread, dome and temperature, and are 
displayed in Table 2. The coefficients of interest are the values of 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁. 
Both 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, at the 1% level, do not equal the value of 1 that the EMH 
predicts. As a result, there are clearly inefficiencies in the market. Additionally, the t 
statistic between 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 shows that I fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 = 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁. Both values are less than one, which means that changes in the spread 
are overvalued, and the actual score difference changes less than the spread does. One 
possible explanation from general finance theory is that markets often overreact to 
information, as Howden (2009) outlines. When the spread changes, it is a result of new 
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information, which causes bettors to overreact, and shift the spread much more than it 
should shift. As a result, the actual final score is less sensitive to additional information 
than the spreads.  
 The 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 coefficient,𝑏2, is positive, which would indicate that a dome actually 
favors the away team (recall that spreads are calculated by away score-home score), 
while holding all other variables constant. However, the values are insignificant. The 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 coefficients,𝑏3, are positive as well, which means that increases in 
temperature favor the away team and decreases in temperature favor the home team, 
while holding all other variables constant. These coefficients are statistically significant, 
and agree with the results from Borghesi (2007), as teams from warm weather struggle in 
colder conditions. The small magnitude of the coefficient signifies that only dramatic 
changes in temperature can impact the score of the game. As Borghesi (2007) describes, a 
change from 60 degrees to 10 degrees gives the home team an unbelievable advantage, 
and my model predicts a decrease in the 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 by 1 (away-home).    
 Equations (5) and (6) include a temperature squared variable in order to further 
analyze temperature as an indicator of the final score. The results are insignificant and 
small in magnitude as with the first two models, so no significant conclusions can be 
drawn for these results. As a result, temperature is not a great indicator of final scores.  
 Equations (7) and (8) incorporate the 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 variable to analyze how 
having a home favorite's effect the spread. The results are shown in Table 4. The 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 
and 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 coefficients have similar results to before, so the same conclusions 
can be drawn from this model. The 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 values are significant and much 
less than one, which implies, similar to previous models, that bettors tend to overreact to 
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newly released information, and as a result changes in the spread are more dramatic than 
the change in the actual score. In this model, I can reject the null hypothesis that the 
𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 and 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 are equal. Furthermore, the opening spread lines are better indicators 
of the actual score than the closing spread line, which contradicts Zuber et al. (1985). One 
possible explanation for this is the idea that earlier in the day, the bettors are bookmakers 
and more informed bettors. As the day progresses, more casual bettors that do not spend 
as much time tracking spreads enter the market, which causes the spread to shift away 
from the actual scores. The dummy variable has a negative coefficient, which is in line 
with my prediction because when the home team is the favorite the score should decrease 
and when the away team is the favorite, the spread should increase. The closing spread 
model has a higher coefficient, which is significant at the 10% level, which means that 
the favorite has a better chance to cover the spread if the team is favorited at the close of 
betting than at the start of betting. The fact that the coefficient is statistically significant 
and less than one does give merit to the idea that favorites are often overestimated, as 
Aadland and Wever (2012) discuss. Since 𝑏1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸is less than 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, bettors on the day 
of play significantly overestimate the home team's ability to score. However, comparing 
these results to the results in Table 2, it is clear that bettors overestimate a team's ability 
to score regardless of who the favorite/home team is. 
 Equations (9) and (10) incorporate a variable for when the home team is the 
underdog to analyze how home underdogs effect the spread. The results are shown in 
Table 5. The 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 coefficients have similar results to before, so 
the same conclusions can be drawn from this model. However, a number of interesting 
conclusions can be drawn from the new additions to the model. The model predicts that 
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increases in the spread make it tougher to cover the spread and decreases in the spread 
make it easier to cover the spread, which intuitively makes sense. The open spread model 
suggests that a one point increase in the 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 results in an additional 0.12 
decrease in the 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡when the away team is favored, as opposed to when 
the home team is favored. In other words, away favorites are less likely to cover the 
spread when the spread increases and more likely to cover the spread when the spread 
decreases (since 𝑏1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = 0.81 and 𝑏5𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = −0.12). This coefficient is insignificant. 
The close spread model predicts similar outcomes. In the closing spread model, an 
increase in 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 by one results in an additional decrease of 0.21 in 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 as compared to home favorites. This coefficient is statistically 
insignificant as well.  
 The test statistic, when comparing 𝑏5𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 to 𝑏5𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸, proves at the 1% level that 
we can reject the null hypothesis, as with the other previous model. Since the two values 
under analysis are statistically significant as well, there is a discrepancy between the  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 that is statistically significant. A shift in the spread 
from open to close, as per EMH, implies that additional information is released on the 
day of the game, causing one team to have an advantage over the previous spread.1 
Generally, on the last day of betting, uninformed bettors must overreact to this newly 
released information, which shifts the spread much more than it should. Using Table 4 to 
analyze away favorites and Table 5 to analyze home favorites, I can use statistically 
significant information, as the dummy variable for 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 
                                                        
1 New advantages/disadvantages can range anywhere from injury updates and weather changes to 
bookmaker's trying to hedge their bets to do the increases frequency of betting on one side.  
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𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 is equal to 0. Specifically, when the away team is the favorite, the 
spread shifts much more than when the home team is the favorite. In other words, if the 
spread shifts toward the favorite, away favorites have a tougher time covering a larger 
spread than home favorites. If the spread shifts toward the underdog, then home favorites 
have a tougher time covering the spread than the away favorites do. One possible theory 
for this phenomenon comes from a combination of Dare and Dennis (2011) and Aadland 
and Wever (2012). When the bettors shift the spread towards the favorite, Dare and 
Dennis (2011), Aadland and Wever (2012) and my results show that away teams struggle 
to cover the spread on the road and home favorites have a much better chance to cover 
high spreads than away favorites. When the bettors shift the spread towards the underdog 
due to newly released information, my results show the spread will shift more toward the 
home underdog than the away underdog, so away favorites will cover the spread more 
often than home favorites. In other words, home underdogs are overestimated compared 
to away underdogs, whereas, away favorites are overestimated compared to home 
favorites.  
 It is important to note that, overall, bettors still overreact to information, as the 
coefficients of opening and closing spreads are less than one. The results match the 
results from Paul and Weinbach (2011), who also find a profitable betting strategy betting 
against the public. Their results look at the last hour, instead of the last day. As a result, a 
profitable betting strategy can be implemented by betting against the general public on 
the last day of betting because bettors overreact to newly released information and bettors 
that participate on the last day are less informed than previous bettors. The results from 
Table 4 and 5 show that if the spread shifts toward the favorite, betting on the home 
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underdog is more profitable than betting on the away underdog; if the spread shifts 
toward the underdog, then it is more profitable to bet on the away favorite than the home 
favorite.   
 Another theory that could prove this anomaly, is the theory of imbalanced books. 
Humphreys (2011) develops a model that proves that bookmakers make additional 
income to the commission charges, and infers that bookkeepers may not fully adjust the 
spreads to convey the "collective judgement," that it should. In the case of the spread 
shifting, bookkeepers could over adjust the spread based on their own opinions more than 
the opinion of the public, with the hope of capitalizing on public misconceptions. No 
matter which theory is accurate, the model does point to inefficiencies in the NFL betting 
market.  
 Table 6 and Table 7 show the results from the hot hand models, which analyze 
how teams on streaks do in comparison to teams not on a streak. The coefficients of 
opening and closing spread are the same and much closer to one, which shows that the 
betting market is inefficient as it relates to teams on streaks. Additionally, the coefficients 
of the streak variables are not significant, small in magnitude, and vary drastically in 
sign, which indicates that a team's past performance does not impact future performance, 
so there are no profitable betting strategies related to the hot hand.   
Limitations and Extensions  
 My study uses money line data to predict the spreads of the games, as opposed to 
the actual spreads of the games. As a result, there could be some bias, as a model to 
predict spreads will accurately represent an efficient market much more than the actual 
spreads might. The models use the EMH to help predict spreads, so there could be 
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additional inefficiencies that I could not point out. Additionally, I did omit 9,142 
observations from my data set, and though it was random and due to an access issue, this 
can significantly skew my results as well. I also do not have any information regarding 
betting volume, so I was only able to analyze bettor popularity by the changes in the 
spread over the last day. A closer look at popularity could also bring light to whether 
bookmakers are using imbalanced books to maximize their profits. There are many injury 
updates and additional factors that result in a change in the spread. My data also spans the 
last day of betting; however, literature proves that 25 percent of the bets in the NFL occur 
in the last hour of betting, but I am not able to analyze the last hour of betting. I also use 
an OLS regression model, which has many benefits; however, many bettors are much 
more interested in whether the bet wins or loses. As a result, some bettors favor the probit 
model, which does not account for the excess points a team covers the spread by. Lastly, 
there is a potential for type I error, which occurs if I reject the null hypothesis when the 
null hypothesis is true. The likelihood is very rare, considering my t statistics were above 
50, but it does need to be mentioned. 
 Despite my papers limitations, the paper provides important insights that can lead 
to future research. The new idea that shows opening lines as a better indicator of the 
score than closing lines can be used in many studies in the future. Studies can run betting 
simulations betting on the shift in the spread to overestimate the shift in the outcome. 
Since the difference in the coefficients of opening and closing spreads have a very low 
magnitude, additional research can provide information on the magnitude of a spread 
shift that provides a profitable betting strategy, as well as the magnitude of the spread 
prior to the shift. Both of these factors will be relevant in putting together a profitable 
41 
 
betting strategy.  
 There is a plethora of literature analyzing the relationship between home field 
advantages and favorites. Some literature proves that bettors underestimate the ability of 
the home team to score. Some literature proves that bettors bet on favorites more often 
than not. Some literature proves that severe underdogs receive more praise than they 
deserve (and hence the spread is lower than it should be). Either way all the literature is 
inconclusive. Since my model is OLS, applying the probit or mean difference error 
methods I outline in my literature review coupled with this new idea of comparing 
opening lines to closing lines could provide additional information as well. My paper 
should pave the way for additional studies to really analyze the changes in the spread 
throughout the betting season, and potentially expose inefficiencies in the NFL betting 
market, as my paper has. Combining the home field advantage and favorite betting 
strategies with the last day (or last hour) of betting might show statistically significant 
simulations.  
 The hot hand biases may be more noticeable earlier in the week, as bettors could 
tend to value past performance when it is much more recent. Further research using 
spreads from earlier in the week could provide more meaningful conclusions to the idea 
of the teams on streaks. Since this paper suggests that many bettors are uninformed, 
bettors may value how the team has been performing overall, as opposed to against the 
spread. So additional research could also analyze teams on streaks could provide better 
results than streaks against the spread.   
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Conclusion 
 This paper utilizes money line data from the opening and closing of betting on 
game day to analyze discrepancies between opening and closing line data. I convert the 
money lines to spread lines using literature. Most literature and theory provide evidence 
that the closing lines are a better indicator of the game outcome, due to late releases of 
injury and other information. This paper finds that bettors tend to overreact to newly 
released information, as spreads move more than the actual scores will move in the NFL 
betting market. This paper also finds significant discrepancies between the opening and 
closing spreads. The results indicate that the opening spreads have a much greater 
correlation to the actual scores than the closing spreads, which contradicts much of the 
previous literature. As a result, the market is inefficient. Bookmakers and other gamblers 
that place their bets early in the week will be more informed because they track the 
spreads early and often. On the last day of betting, more uninformed casual bettors enter 
the market, who are less successful in predicting final scores. The results suggest that the 
markets overreact to changes in information. In the stock market, investors tend to 
overreact to shocks, which is why dramatic changes in the market correct itself over time. 
Since the NFL betting market does not have time to correct itself, as eventually the game 
takes place, maybe the market does not have time to fully correct the overreaction. If 
bookmakers and the media distribute the information more efficiently, the market itself 
will run more efficiently. The inefficiency and lack of bettor awareness provide insight in 
to why sports gambling remains illegal in many places. The unpredictability in sports, 
often due to exogenous factors, does not mirror other markets and can explain the 
inability of bettors to succeed. Until then, there can be a profitable betting strategy by 
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betting against the shift in the spread, as the shift in the score is predicted to be less than 
the shift in the spread. Furthermore, if the shift moves toward a favorite, it is more 
profitable to bet on a home underdog than an away underdog. If the shift moves toward 
the underdog, it is more profitable to bet on the away favorite than the home favorite.   
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